Stop at the fold
If you stop reading Roger Cohen's latest column on Iran in The New York Times before the fold (yes, some of us still read the actual newspaper), Cohen's argument appears well-considered and interesting. But things turn sour if you read all the way to the end.
During the Bush years, Cohen writes in "Realpolitik for Iran," Washington repeatedly turned down opportunities to engage the regime in Tehran and perhaps turn it away from the path of extremism and terrorism.
Imagine if Roosevelt in 1942 had said to Stalin, sorry, Joe, we don’t like your Communist ideology so we’re not going to accept your help in crushing the Nazis. I know you’re powerful, but we don’t deal with evil.
That’s a rough equivalent on the stupidity scale of what Bush achieved by consigning Iran’s theocracy to the axis of evil and failing to probe how the country might have helped in two wars and the wider Middle East when the conciliatory Mohammad Khatami was president.
Seldom in the annals of American diplomacy has moral absolutism trumped realism to such devastating effect. Bush gifted Iran increased power without taking even a peek at how that might serve U.S. objectives.
Over the last few years, Iran indeed has grown more powerful, making the price for peace with the Islamic Republic much higher than it was in 2001, when Iran was a far less formidable foe. The Bushies can argue that talking with Iran would have rewarded Tehran for bad behavior, but President Bush's failure to punish Iran adequately essentially amounted to the same thing.
The U.S. goal is to curb Iranian power, its support for terrorism and its nuclear weapons program. Obama may believe it ought to be done with carrots, and Bush may have believed it should be done with sticks. Reasonable people can disagree about which strategy might yield the most gains. But it's clear that embracing neither option, as Bush did, produces the most dangerous result.
Here's Cohen's view of what a U.S.-Iran peace deal might look like today:
Iran ceases military support for Hamas and Hezbollah; adopts a “Malaysian” approach to Israel (nonrecognition and noninterference); agrees to work for stability in Iraq and Afghanistan; accepts intrusive International Atomic Energy Agency verification of a limited nuclear program for peaceful ends only; promises to fight Qaeda terrorism; commits to improving its human rights record.
The United States commits itself to the Islamic Republic’s security and endorses its pivotal regional role; accepts Iran’s right to operate a limited enrichment facility with several hundred centrifuges for research purposes; agrees to Iran’s acquiring a new nuclear power reactor from the French; promises to back Iran’s entry into the World Trade Organization; returns seized Iranian assets; lifts all sanctions; and notes past Iranian statements that it will endorse a two-state solution acceptable to the Palestinians.
Cohen goes wrong when he drags Israel into it. Noting that an Israeli attack on Iran could derail any such peace deal, he concludes:
To avoid that nightmare Obama will have to get tougher with Israel than any U.S. president in recent years. It’s time.
Why does every Cohen column about Iran end up being about slamming Israel?
Israel has not stood in the way of U.S. contacts with Iran. On the contrary, many Israelis, such as Daniel Levy, an adviser in the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office under Ehud Barak, have pushed for the U.S. to engage with Iran (see Levy's December 2007 Op-Ed in JTA).
Those, like Obama, who espouse the engagement approach toward Iran should not make the same mistake Cohen does in nearly every column on Iran: They should understand the true nature of the regime in Tehran (expecting its nuclear program to resemble Brazil's or Japan's, as Cohen hopes, is a bit unrealistic) and recognize that the obstacle to peace in the Middle East today is not in Jerusalem, but in Tehran.
Demonizing Israel, as Cohen does, obscures the point.
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How Obama can change the US-Iran dynamic
Regarding the April 1 article, “Clinton says US met with Iran delegate”: President Obama used the occasion of the Persian New Year to reach out last week to the Iranian government, offering in a video message a new era of “engagement that is honest and grounded in mutual respect.”
Change in America’s Iran policy is much needed and long overdue. Yet, that change is not conceivable without understanding the dynamics of Iranian politics. Every US president since Jimmy Carter has sought a coherent Iran policy and has been interested in negotiations with this regime. But all have failed for one reason or another.
Iran observers generally acknowledge that there are two Irans: the one of octogenarian mullahs and the one in vibrant cities. And these two Irans are worlds apart.
As long as Iran remains synonymous with the fundamentalist regime that rules it, US policy options are very limited: more concessions or military action, both of which are doomed to failure.
But how can the US reach out to the Iranian people? The key to such change is the administration’s approach to the mullahs and their main opposition, the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK).
In 1997, the Clinton administration proposed direct dialogue with Tehran. To set the stage, then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright designated the MEK as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. One senior Clinton official acknowledged at the time that the “inclusion of the Mujahedin was intended as a goodwill gesture to Tehran and its newly elected moderate president, Mohammed Khatami.”
The Bush administration not only continued with the same policy, but went even further by bombing MEK’s camps in Iraq during the 2003 invasion, as part of a quid pro quo with Tehran.
It is evident that making concessions to Tehran is counterproductive. Constraining the MEK was a gift to the mullahs, who perceived the move as a sign of weakness and became even more brazen in their dealings with the West.
If Mr. Obama is serious about change in US-Iran policy, he should take the bold initiative of revoking the MEK’s terrorist designation as the most vivid hallmark of that policy change. Such a move would even make talks with Tehran more effective, since it sends the mullahs a message of strength. This indeed is the change which is not only overdue, but one which puts the United States on the right side of history.
I don’t believe that Cohen was “demonizing” Israel - but rather reacting to very real military exercises by IDF, comments made by PM Netanyahu and others in his cabinet, and the general Israeli public support for a pre-emptive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities.
I concur with Mr. Cohen: “To avoid that nightmare Obama will have to get tougher with Israel than any U.S. president in recent years.”
I will grant you that the following sentence: “It’s time.” Is editorial in nature - and not necessary within the context of what I think is a well considered column.
Mr. Cohen’s nonsensical theory that peace can be made with Iran’s leaders if Obama gets even tougher than ever before on Israel is like arguing that peace could have been made with Hitler if only the Allies had been even tougher on Czechoslovakia. Leaders committed to “Death to America” will not be satisfied by our throwing Israel under the bus.
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Majid Saatchi
04/13/09 06:34 PM
After 30 years of dealing with the United States and Europe, the Iranian regime has mastered two qualities: How to achieve objectives by bullying and blackmail; and, how to recycle its political refuse and reuse it in the US.
There is not much new to comment on regarding three decades of blackmail. The history is speaks for itself: The US embassy hostage taking, a decade of hostage trading in Lebanon, kidnapping the Middle East peace process in the 1990s and finally, with the fall of Saddam Hussein and the weakening of Palestinian authority, using the regional stability as a bargain chip.
Mohammad Khatami’s recent candidacy for presidency illustrates Mullahs masterful art in selling an archaic political system as an example of good governance and indigenous democracy. The United States has been so far one of the prime consumers of this Iranian “democratic” masquerade. In their endeavor to sell their mockery, the Mullahs have enjoyed the support of some American friends. Let’s have a look at some comments by the Iran-experts:
Suzanne Maloney (Brookings Institution): “Iran has been a functioning democracy - albeit very limited - since the revolution in 1979. There have been something along the lines of 21 national elections in 22 years, and they have taken place even at times of great tension.” (Brookings Institution, June 11, 2001)
Ray Takeyh (senior expert at CFR): “Iran’s Islamic polity largely reflects fundamental features of democracy: free elections, separation of powers, freedom of assembly and a vibrant press.” (MEPC October 2000)
Ambassador Robert H. Pelletreau: “There are many who find the Iranian electoral system imperfect, especially the vetting role of the Council of Guardians, but we should also recognize the elements of democracy which are present: choice among candidates, public debate over programs and positions, and the secret ballot.” 1
In addition to legitimizing the Theocratic regime, these Iran experts have also tried to fuel a permanent hope that the Iranian power structure is experiencing a self-transformation to a more pragmatic regime that will eventually accommodate international norms. For these experts, whatever happens in Iran, there would be an emerging pragmatic leader ready to have a deal with the U.S! It suffices to be “expert” and discover these genuine leaders with hidden qualities.
After 15 years of presenting Rafsanjani as a moderate and Khatami as a reformist, it was Ahmadinejad’s turn. Ray Takeyh found an original designation for Ahmadinejad and called him the “assertive nationalists."2 Gary Sick called him a prideful man with a sense of Iranian pride.3
When this pridful and assertive nationalist started to disgust the public opinion, it was time to find a new window of hope. It was Commander Ali Larijani’s turn. Once again, the prize goes to Ray Takeyh who holds the record in discovering moderates in Tehran. In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 19, 2006, Takeyh called Larijani the leader of new generation of realists in Tehran:
“Realists: One of the most important actors in Iran today is the powerful Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani. As the leader of a new generation of realists that evolved in the intelligence community in the 1990s, this cohort’s has predominant influence over the direction of Iran’s international relations.”
Then, Trita Parsi, the president of NIAC called Larijani a “former hawk-turned-relative pragmatist”:4 This masterful art of recycling the former commanders of the Revolutionary Guards reached new summits of imagination when it was Tehran mayor Ghalibaf’s turn. New York Times writer Alan Cowell called him an “authoritarian modernizer”!5
“Among the contenders in attendance this year is Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf, the 46-year-old mayor of Tehran who is being urged by some to run for the presidency of Iran next year as an “authoritarian modernizer.”
Maziar bahari went further and wrote in Newsweek about Ghalibaf’s unheard qualities:6
“But where Ahmadinejad is confrontational and “showboaty,” Ghalibaf is a pragmatist with a reputation for getting things done. The president spent much of his previous career as a junior bureaucrat, while the mayor’s résumé lists one overachievement after another.
As top cop he won yet more fans. In 2003 he did something virtually unheard of: he quelled a student protest without bloodshed by holding talks with student leaders and ordering his men not to use batons or guns in dispersing the crowds.”
Here we are. The Iranian regime’s new spring electoral circus has been launched. No doubt, some American journalist will compete to have a front seat for the show in Tehran. Expect that they will do their best to recycle the Iranian regime’s political refuse and sell it to the American public again.
SOURCES
1. Ambassador Robert H. Pelletreau, Remarks to the American-Iranian Council-Iranian Trade Association. February 4, 2000, Washington DC
2. Ray Takeyh, Christian Science Monitor, 9.29.2005
3. Gary Sick’s Interviewer with Bernard Gwertzman, CFR, September 22, 2005
4. Trita Parsi, “Larijani’s Election can Boost Congressional Diplomacy”, 5.5.2008 <link>
5. Alan Cowell, “Tehran’s Mayor Speaks of Making Iran Less Isolated”. New York Times, January 27, 2008
<link>
6. Maziar Bahari, “Iran: A Brewing Battle of Heavyweights in Tehran”, Newsweek, 1.8.2007 <link>